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SUMMARY
Following a period o f economic growth, political stability and poverty reduction spanning two 
decades (1960-1979), 1 Costa Rica experienced at the beginning o f the 1980's the worst recession 
in its most recent history. In 1981 and 1982 gross domestic product (GDP) fell by -2.3% and - 
7.3%. Analysts pinpoint to short term economic factors and long run structural problems as the 
main causes o f the recession. Short term economic factors comprise the end o f the coffee price 
bonanza and the second oil shock. Long run structural factors are rooted in the economic 
imbalances generated by the adoption o f import substitution strategies.
In 1985 the authorities undertook a change o f regime which mixed free market with state 
intervention policies. Free market policies aimed at getting “the prices right” by liberalizing trade 
through tariff and traditional export tax reduction, and by eliminating trade barriers. State 
intervention policies were encapsulated into non-traditional export promotion schemes and a 
target real exchange rate tending to favour export performance. These government policies were 
justified on the grounds o f compensating the anti-export bias that guided the commercial policy 
o f Costa Rica during the import substitution era.
The implementation process was very gradual and began with export promotion policies 
followed by reduction of import and export barriers.
From 1986 to 1994 trade liberalization policies were followed on a systematic basis. The 
tariff ceiling was substantially reduced, and tariff dispersion as well as effective protection 
diminished. Taxes levied on non traditional exports disappeared, while taxes on traditional 
exports were significantly lowered. Finally, most non tariff barriers were eliminated as 
quantitative import restrictions were replaced with tariffs in compliance with the Uruguay Round 
negotiations o f the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
During 1995-1996, the country experienced temporary interruptions in its tariff reduction 
and trade liberalization commitments in part due to a recession caused by internal contractionary 
policies and external factors (i.e., “the Tequila effect”). In 1997 as GDP growth overcame its 
trough, the authorities continued their outward oriented efforts. The policy centered mostly on a 
national tariff reduction schedule that would comply with the Central American Common 
External Tariff. The country plans to reach this tariff schedule in the year 2000.
W hile trade liberalization has eliminated import surcharges and lowered, to great extent, 
the weight o f export taxes in fiscal revenue, the same cannot be said about import duties. Export 
taxes represented 23.3% of total revenue in 1983. By 1994-1998, they represented 2.1%. The 
reduction o f fiscal dependence on export taxes has shielded the fiscal accounts from the volatility 
o f primary commodity price fluctuation.
Some authors actually mention three decades (Céspedes & Jiménez (1994), p.11).
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Import duties have, however, increased their weight in fiscal revenue. They accounted for 
5.6% of total revenue in 1983 and for 13.2% for 1994-1998. The greater dependency o f fiscal 
equilibrium on import duties is due both an increase in the import tax base as a consequence of 
liberalization and perhaps to a shift in the propensity to import. If  trade reform has allowed a 
better allocation of resources by liberalizing import prices, it has also placed a restriction on 
output growth by increasing the possibilities of a balance-of-payments constraint scenario.
Export promotion policies materialized into tax exemption schemes such as the CAT (tax 
redemption certificates). CATs were equivalent to an income tax deduction and represented 1.9% 
of total expenditure in 1985 and 4.2% by 1994-1998. The government has stopped the issue of 
new CATs and their fiscal impact will vanish by the year 2000. This will certainly be a source a 
fiscal respite and a basis on which to further reduce import duties without compromising internal 
equilibrium.
3
This paper analyses the trade liberalization policies in Costa Rica for 1980-1998 and their fiscal 
impact. Following this introduction the second section centres on a brief description of 
macroeconomic performance for these years. The third and fourth sections address the 
commercial policy regime o f Costa Rica and the history o f tariff reduction efforts. The fifth 
section analyses non-tariff barriers and other import taxes. The sixth and seventh sections 
examine export taxes, export trade barriers as well as export promotion policies. Finally, the last 
section relates trade taxes and export promotion policies to fiscal performance. In this section the 
fiscal accounts are divided into internal and external sources o f revenue.
1. Introduction
2. M acroeconomic performance: 1980-1998
During the beginning o f the 1980's Costa Rica suffered the worst recession in its most recent 
history. In 1981 and 1982, GDP registered negative growth rates (-2.3% and -7.3% respectively), 
and inflation surpassed the 50% annual barrier. The fiscal deficit was 8% and 4% of GDP for 
1980 and 1981 while the external gap reached 15% of GDP (see table 1).
T able  1
SE L E C T E D  M A C R O E C O N O M IC  IN D IC A T O R S  O F C O S T A  R IC A , 1 9 8 0 -1 9 8 6
G D P
gro w th
In fla tion T O T
R ea l w a g e s  






IP E D /
G D P
1980 17 .8 104 .1 9 8 .6 8 .2 14 .8 1.21 4 .0
1981 -2 .3 6 5 .1 8 8 .8 8 8 .6 3 .6 15 .2 1.11 10 .9
1982 -7 .3 8 1 .7 9 1 .2 8 2 .5 2 .6 11.1 1.01 5 .0
1983 2 .9 10 .7 99 .3 9 4 .4 4 .2 10 .0 1.04 9 .5
1984 8 .0 17.3 10 2 .8 9 9 .3 3 .0 6 .0 1.18 5 .7
1985 0 .5 10 .9 107 .5 10 3 .2 1.9 7 .4 1.07 8 .6
1986 5 .5 15 .4 13 7 .4 10 5 .2 3.3 3 .6 1.18 4 .2
A v g . 1 9 8 0 -1 9 8 2 -4 .8 5 4 .9 9 4 .7 8 9 .9 6 .2 13 .7 1.11 6 .6
A v g . 1 9 8 3 -1 9 8 6 4 .2 13 .6 11 1 .8 100 .5 3.1 6 .8 1.12 7
S o u rce: E C L A C  (1 9 9 9 ).
N o te : O C  =  o p en n ess co effic ien t.
IP E D  =  in terest pa id  o n  external debt.
The openness coefficient was calculated only on the basis of trade flows and in real terms. 
This is to avoid distortions in the computation of this coefficient that arise out structural changes in the 
composition of GDP and relative price variations. Data was only available for 1980-1996.
4
The causes are rooted in long run structural factors and short run phenomena in the guise 
o f external shocks. Long run factors refer to an import substitution strategy that outlived its 
usefulness. The more immediate short run factors include a reversal o f the coffee prize bonanza 
that prevailed throughout the 1970's coupled with the second oil shock (1979).
W ithin this scenario the authorities set ambitious goals centring on the reduction o f the 
budget deficit to a range between 1%-2% of GDP; the implementation o f an outward oriented 
commercial policy to achieve a level o f export growth that would account for 50% of GDP 
growth; the re-establishment o f the purchasing power o f wages and the reduction in the burden of 
interest rate payment on the external debt.
In 1982 Costa Rica began the implementation o f a stabilization package followed in 1984 
by the design o f a comprehensive structural adjustment programme that mixed market 
instruments with strong state intervention. The programme was put into practice with the signing 
o f the structural adjustment programme (PAE) in 1985. 2 The de fa c to  implementation o f the 
programme has proceeded gradually and has lasted until the present. 3
The adoption o f market instruments was encapsulated under the rubric “getting relative 
prices right.” In the foreign trade arena this meant the dismantling o f trade barriers, both tariff 
barriers as well as non tariff barriers in the form o f permits, licenses, quotas and the like. The 
reduction in nominal tariffs was suppose to reduce both tariff dispersion and rates o f effective 
protection. Table 2 shows selected structural adjustment measures related to trade liberalization 
since the programme began. Table 3 shows the tax structure in 1982 prior to the reform and 
highlights the tax barriers to trade prevailing during this period.
2 Besides a trade reform, the structural adjustment programme included also a financial and 
government reforms. This paper deals exclusively with the trade reform policies.
3 When comparing the economy's performance before and after the reform it should not be 
forgotten that the decision to carry out an economic reform, by itself, allowed the country to renegotiate 
its foreign debt and to obtain considerable amounts of foreign funds to finance its structural adjustment 
process.
5
C O S T A  R IC A : SE L E C T E D  R E F O R M  M E A S U R E S  R E L A T E D  T O  T R A D E  L IB E R A L IZ A T IO N ,
1 9 8 4 -1 9 9 8
Table 2
Y ea r M easu res
1984 L a w  fo r  fin a n c ia l equ ilib riu m  in the private sector. T he la w  incorporates the p rom otion  
o f  exports through  three export reg im es: export contracts, tem poral a d m iss io n  and free  
trade z o n es .
1985 C entral A m erica n  T a r iff C ode. T he im port tariffs are co m p rised  w ith in  a  range o f  1% to 
100% .
1986 F irst structural adjustm ent program m e. T he program m e in c lu d es the gradual red uction  o f  
ta r iff o n  im port g o o d s  and  e lim in a tio n  o f  quantity restrictions.
1987 Im port d ep o sits  are red uced  fo rm  50%  to  10%  and f in a lly  b a n ish ed  in  1992.
1989 S eco n d  structural adjustm ent program m e. T he program m e seek s  to u n ify  im port duties  
w ith in  a  5% -40%  tar iff range. P ro v id es a  sch ed u le  o f  p ro g ressiv e  red uction  o f  the tar iff  
ce ilin g .
1989 T he 10%  ad  valorem  tax  o n  c o ffe e  profits is  m o d ified  to a  range o f  2 .5%  to  10%.
1990 C osta  R ic a  jo in s  G A T T . F o llo w in g  G A T T  regu lations agrees to rep lace quantity im port 
restrictions fo r  so m e  products w ith  tariffs. T h ese  are n eg o tia ted  o n  a  55% -274%  range. 
T he produ cts in c lu d e  agricultural products. T w o  agricultural products, c h ick en  parts and  
m ilk  products are su bject to  ta r iff quotas.
1992 T he Central B a n k  im port surcharge w h ic h  var ied  b e tw e en  a  range o f  0%  and 100%  is  
elim inated .
1992 L a w  o n  the R eg u la tio n  o f  a ll ta x  exoneration s and its e x cep tio n s  (L aw  N o . 7 2 9 3 )  
b a n ish es m o st ex em p tio n s to the paym en t o f  ta x es in c lu d in g  im port taxes.
1994 T he 3%  tax  o n  a ll im ports is  red uced  to  1%.
1 9 9 5 -1 9 9 6 Param eters o f  the Central A m erican  C o m m o n  E xternal T ariff. 0%  fo r  raw m ateria ls and  
capita l g o o d s , 5%  and 10%  fo r  interm ediate inputs and 20%  fo r  f in a l g o o d s. T he  20%  
c e ilin g  is  further red uced  to  15%  in  the y ea r  1997 .
1996 T he export contract and tem p oral a d m iss io n  reg im es are rep laced  b y  the regimen  
devolutivo de derechos and regimen de perfeccionam iento activo.
1997 C osta  R ic a  adopts a  fin a l ta r iff red uction  sch ed u le  w ith  the a im  o f  arriving at the 15%  
c e ilin g  b y  the y ea r  2 0 0 0 .
1998 In  July 19 9 9  the authorities app ly  the c o m m o n  external tar iff sch ed u le  b y  red u cin g  tariffs 
fo r  interm ediate g o o d s  from  16%  to  15% .
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Table 3
TAX STRUCTURE OF COSTA RICA, 1982
C on cept R ate
In co m e tax
In d iv idual 15%  to  50%
F irm s 5%  to 50%
S a les tax 8%
S e lec t iv e  co n su m p tio n  tax 6%  to 100%
E xp ort ta x es
A d  valorem  du ties 6%
A d  valorem  du ties fo r  banana and c o ffe e 1%
A d  valorem  du ties fo r  c o ffe e 4%  to 18%
A d  valorem  d u ties fo r  sugar 1% to 18%
T a riff reg im e
Capital g o o d s 10%  to  40%
Interm ediate g o o d s 0%  to 20%
F in a l g o o d s 10%  to  2 40%
S o u rce: B ren es (1 9 9 4 ).
Relative prices were thus seen as vehicles to allocate resources according to their relative 
scarcities. Moreover, according to Costa Rican analysts market mechanisms was also suppose to 
suppress one the most important unproductive and distortion creating activities, namely rent 
seeking activities.
Government intervention in the foreign trade area followed two complementary routes. 
On the hand it was directed to compensate for the bias anti-export that characterized the import 
substitution era.
To this end, government intervention was channelled through compensatory trade 
measures and most import through subsidies. Perhaps the most representative instrument o f this 
view point was the CAT (tax redemption certificate). The CAT was a certificate issued by the 
authorities to non-traditional exporters for a value equivalent to 15% of the fob value o f exports. 
The CAT has a period o f maturation o f eighteen months. After eighteen months it could be
7
exchanged against an equivalent reduction in the income tax bill or sold in a special market for 
CATs. 4
On the other hand, state intervention was oriented to maintain a real exchange rate target 
to revamp export activities. Prior to 1984, the exchange rate policy followed a nominal exchange 
rate regime that resulted in devaluations in 1981 (55%) and in 1982. From 1984 onwards the 
authorities undertook an announced policy o f minidevaluations followed in 1992 by a dirty 
floating exchange rate regime. Overall independently o f the de ju re  exchange rate regime, the 
exchange rate has shown a tendency to depreciate in real terms favouring export performance. 5 
(See Graph 1).
G raph 1
C O S T A  R IC A : R E A L  E F F E C T IV E  E X C H A N G E  
R A T E  B E H A V IO U R , 1 9 7 9 -1 9 9 3
(1 9 8 5 = 1 0 0 )
YEARS
S o u rce: C ésp ed es &  J im én ez  (1 9 9 4 ).
Chronologically speaking Costa Rica undertook first the adoption o f export promotion 
policies and then proceeded to a progressive tariff reduction that would allow import 
liberalization. In 1984, the authorities approved the Law for Financial Equilibrium in the Public 
Sector which sought to obtain fiscal equilibrium by both decreasing government expenditure
4 It is worth noting that while according to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules the CAT is 
considered a subsidy not all Costa Rican economists agree on this matter. Lizano (1999) states that the 
CAT is not a subsidy but rather a compensation for the existence of economic distortions that hinder the 
development of the non traditional export sector. A similar argument has been put forward in the case of 
another Central American country, El Salvador, to rationalize the existence of a 6% drawback on the value 
of exports.
5 See Céspedes & Jiménez (1994) and more recently Robbins & Gindling (1999). However, 
Monge & Vega (1994) estimate a real exchange rute (RER) based on purchasing power for 1974-1989 and 
conclude that the real exchange rate in fact appreciated during most of the period.
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(through contraction in government employment, and early government employee retirement) 
and increasing government revenue (by prolonging existing surcharges including import 
surcharges and increasing other charges). A t the same time this law also consolidated regulations 
to enhance export performance. These regulations included export contracts and free trade zones. 
In addition the government reformed the export tax regime creating the National Investment 
Council and simplified export permit paperwork.
Tariff reduction began in 1986 with the implementation o f the Central American Tariff 
Import Code (see section 5 for a detailed explanation). The Central American Tariff Import Code 
contemplated a tariff range within 1%-100%. The 100% tariff rate ceiling was applied on some 
selected final goods and meant a significant reduction from the pre existing 240% level (see 
table 3).
Between 1986 and 1993, the country pursued on a continuous basis outward oriented 
policies. In 1989 and 1992 the tariff ceiling was reduced to 40% and 20%; import deposits were 
significantly lowered in 1989 and eliminated in 1992. Taxes on non traditional exports were 
abolished while taxes on traditional exports lost importance as a revenue source for the central 
government. Costa Rica joined GATT in 1989 and as a consequence o f the Uruguay Round 
negotiations in 1984, replaced quantitative restriction on imports for tariffs and for tariff quotas 
for a couple o f products.
During this time exports and in particular non traditional exports, experienced an 
important surge. The ratio o f non traditional to traditional exports increased by twofold on 
average between 1980-1985 and 1986-1994 (see table 4). By 1997 the value o f this ratio stood at 
3.09. 6 The dynamic behaviour o f non-traditional exports reflects export diversification and 
amplified in a substantial way the export base. The difference in the rate o f growth of export 
volume on average between 1980-1985 (1%) and 1986-1994 (13%) was due in greater part to this 
factor.
T able  4
C O S T A  R IC A : E X P O R T  A N D  IM P O R T  P E R F O R M A N C E , 1 9 8 6 -1 9 9 3
Y ea r E xp ort v o lu m e  grow th N on -trad itiona l to  traditional exports Im ports to  exports
1 9 8 0 -1 9 8 5 0 .9 0 .6 6 1.19
1 9 8 6 -1 9 9 4 13 .0 1.32 1.28
S o u rce: E C L A C  (1 9 9 9 ).
In 1998 the ratio took on a value of 4 but this responds in greater part to the Integrated 
Electronics (INTEL) effect on exports.
9
The export expansion had a positive effect o f growth and for some analysts on real wages 
and on employment 7. Another important factor that contributed to growth during this period is 
foreign external aid.8 GDP grew at an average rate o f 4.9% and GDP per capita by 4.8. Relative 
to other periods as shown in graph 2 GDP per capita reflected a time o f economic stability.
However, Costa Rica also experienced several macroeconomic shortcomings some 
derived from the policies implemented during this time.
For one thing, trade liberalization policies permitted an increase in the ratio o f imports to 
exports. That is at the same time that exports experienced an upward shift in their trend, imports 
began to grow at a faster pace than exports. This phenomenon is due both to import barrier 
reduction and probably to changes in the import elasticity o f income brought about by 
stabilization and structural adjustment policies. 9 Thus at the same time that outward oriented 
policies create the conditions for growth by promoting exports they also put a limit to growth by 
enhancing import expenditure. This enforces the balance-of-payment constraint on output 
expansion.
In addition, the budget deficit became a source o f concern to the authorities as it exhibited 
an increasing trend throughout the period and on average reached 6.2 o f GDP. The main reason 
for the deficit lies in the increase in expenditure brought about by the interest burden o f the 
internal debt (see table 27 o f the appendix). The ratio o f total expenditure to GDP was 18.2% in 
1985 and reached 22% in 1995. Taxes as a percent o f GDP remained practically constant. The 
ratio o f taxes to GDP in 1985 was 19% and in 1994 it stood at 14.7%. Although export taxes 
decreased income taxes increased and so did the revenue derived from import taxes. This last 
phenomenon is explained by the fact that the decrease in tariff rates and other import taxes was 
compensated by the increase in the import tax base (see graph 3).
7 Traditional analyses in Costa Rica that examine the relation between wages and trade have 
concluded that trade liberalization increases wages, equity, and reduces unemployment and poverty. 
Lizano (1999) is a case in point. A more recent analysis (Robbins & Gindling, 1999), using the theoretical 
endogenous growth framework, concludes that trade liberalization favours skilled workers at the expense 
of unskilled workers. Trade liberalization leads to larger markets inducing a greater research and 
development effort, increasing thus the stock of technical knowledge and reallocates labour to the 
activities that require higher levels of education (Ibid. p.141). The increase in the relative demand for 
skilled workers increases the relative skilled-unskilled wage gap.
8 According to the Britannica, foreign external loans accounted in 1986 for one third of the 
country’s income (Britannica, Macropaedia, Vol 15, p. 690).
9 In fact one of the unforeseen effects of stabilization cum structural adjustment programmes is 
the growth of private consumption and its orientation to import expenditure. The same phenomenon 
occurs in the case of the Dominican Republic. This may be the reason that explains the slow road to 
import duty reduction taken by the Dominican authorities. See Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO) report on the fiscal impact of trade liberalization in the Dominican Republic.
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S o u rce: E C L A C  (1 9 9 9 ).
T ab le  5
SE L E C T E D  M A C R O E C O N O M IC  IN D IC A T O R S  O F C O S T A  R IC A , 1 9 8 6 -1 9 9 4
G D P
gro w th
In fla tion T O T
R ea l w a g e s  






IP E D /
G D P
1986 5 .5 15 .4 13 7 .4 10 5 .2 3.3 3 .6 1.18 6 .9
1987 4 .8 16 .4 10 6 .9 101 .5 2 .0 8.3 1.31 6 .8
1988 3 .4 2 5 .3 10 4 .9 9 6 .4 2 .5 6 .6 1.27 7 .7
1989 5 .7 10 103 .1 9 8 .8 4 .1 9 .2 1.43 8.3
1990 3 .6 2 7 .3 100 100 4 .4 8 .7 1.17 5.3
1991 2 .3 2 5 .3 10 0 .9 9 6 .9 3.1 1.8 145 3 .9
1992 7 .7 17 10 5 .7 9 8 .7 1.9 6 .0 1.68 2 .8
1993 6 .3 9.1 10 5 .6 10 2 .8 1.9 9 .0 1.75 2 .7
1994 4 .5 19 .9 102. 105 .5 6 .9 6 .3 1.71 2 .1




COSTA RICA: TOTAL TAXES AND EXPENDITURE AS % OF GDP, 1985-1994
Years
— EXP/GDP  
— TTAX/GDP  
- O  EXP/TAX  
A INCT/GDP
Source: Brenes (1994); CEPAL (1999). 
Note: EXP = Expenditure.
TTAX = Total Tax.
INCT = Income Tax.
By the end o f 1994, the fiscal situation had become critical and was aggravated by the 
closing o f “the bank Anglocostarricense.” The Central Bank assumed its loses increasing its quasi 
fiscal deficit and generating increases in money supply growth. This was counteracted by 
contractionary measures which increased rates o f interests. The basic lending interest rate 
increased from 23.3% in nominal and 3.8% in real terms in 1994 to 33% and 7.1% respectively in
1995.
In addition, the Mexican crisis generated uncertainty regarding growth prospects for the 
Latin American region and the behaviour o f capital inflows. Costa Rica, experienced a decrease 
in foreign capital inflows increasing the country’s external vulnerability. This in combination 
with an overvaluation of the national currency led the authorities to increase the devaluation rate.
Thus while devaluations increased inflation, contractionary measures., a growing fiscal 
deficit and uncertainty regarding future growth prospects retarded the rates o f growth o f GDP. In 
1995, inflation reached 23%, GDP grew by 2.5% and the fiscal deficit registered 4.5% of GDP 
(see table 6). The unstable short run economic situation led to a temporary halt in the 
implementation o f outward oriented policies. In particular, in 1995 the authorities instituted a 8% 
temporary tariff increase for six months to reduce the fiscal deficit. Some analysts also point to 
the abandonment o f agricultural exposure to foreign competition. 10
10 Academia de Centroamérica (1997), p.46.
12
Table 6
SELECTED MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS OF COSTA RICA, 1995-1998
G D P
G row th
In fla tion T O T R ea l w a g e s  





O C IP E D /
G D P
1995 2 .4 2 2 .6 100 10 3 .2 4 .5 4 .0 1.75 2 .4
1996 -0 .6 13 .9 94 .3 105 .3 5 .2 2 .9 1.78 2 .1
1997 3 .7 11 .2 104 10 9 .2 3 .9 2 .2 1.8
1998 6 .2 12 .4 10 6 .6 11 3 .0 3 .2 2 .8 2 .0
A v g . 1 9 9 5 -1 9 9 8 2 .9 15 .0 10 1 .2 10 7 .7 4 .2 3 .0 2 .1
S o u rce: E C L A C  (1 9 9 9 ).
From the middle o f 1995 until 1998, the authorities decided to set a definite course for the 
further elaboration and implementation o f economic reforms along the lines followed from 1986 
and 1994. First, the government passed a tax package to reduce the budget deficit that included 
an increase in the sales tax from 13% to 15% and a 1% tax paid on the assets o f private 
companies. Second, a new Central Bank law was passed in November 1995, and the government 
banks initiated a process re-structuring.
Following the recommendations of a special government appointed commission, the 
authorities expressed their intention of reducing the burden o f the internal debt by a set of 
measure that included further increasing taxes as well as selling state owned assets. Tariff 
reduction and Central American harmonization goals were once again temporarily suspended for 
fiscal reasons in 1996. In 1997 the authorities announced a definitive tax reduction calendar in 
compliance with the Central American uniform tariff goals.
The effects o f the reforms were not felt until 1997 and 1998. Indeed, the country 
experienced a recession in 1996 (-0.6%) and the budget deficit remained a high levels in terms of 
GDP (5.2%) the current account experienced a positive performance probably due to the 
contraction in imports (due in turn to the decrease in income) and to export expansion (as a result 
o f real currency devaluations). The GDP turnaround was aided by the realization that the 
monetary authorities needed to carry out a more flexible monetary policy in combination with the 
announcement o f the decision by Integrated Electronics (INTEL) to install a plant in Costa Rica 
were important factors in the turnaround o f economic performance.
3. The commercial regime
The guidelines for Costa R ica's commercial policy start with a simple and obvious fact: its size. 
A small country such as Costa Rica cannot progress unless it promotes its exports. Since the 
country began its structural adjustment efforts its commercial regime objective has been to allow 
the country’s exports a bigger and diverse outlets. The country is particularly interested in
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obtaining a better access for its textiles and fruit products to the United States market. Costa Rica 
is part o f the Central American Common Market (CACM) since 1960, joined the multi fiber 
agreement in 1988, the GATT in 1990 and the WTO in January 1995. However, the country is 
not part o f the generalized system o f preferences (GSP).
Costa Rica has also signed several bilateral free trade agreements. It was the first Central 
American Country to subscribe a trade agreement with Mexico (1994), with Panama (1974) and 
with the Dominican Republic (1981). It is also part o f the effort to build the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA) by the year 2005.
The participation o f Costa Rica in multilateral and bilateral trade agreements has been the 
institutional backbone for the country’s efforts in progressive import and export tariff, elimination 
o f other trade taxes and non tariff barriers. The paper now turns to an analysis o f these.
4. The evolution of the tariff reduction and its effects
Up until the mid 1980's the tariff schedule adopted by the authorities was that o f the CACM (see 
table 1). The CACM adopted tariffs as the main policy tool for promoting regional 
industrialization. In 1959 the official tariff ceiling was 150% (although for some products the 
ceiling was 695%) and the tariff floor was 15%. Table 7 shows the average tariff levels for 
Central American countries a the beginning o f the 1980's and for 1987.
T able  7
P R E -R E F O R M  A N D  P O S T  R E F O R M  A V E R A G E  T A R IF F  L E V E L  F O R  
C E N T R A L  A M E R IC A N  C O U N T R IE S
P re-reform  average tar iff A v era g e  leg a l tariff, 1987
C osta  R ica 52 26
E l Sa lvad or 48 23
G uatem ala 50 25
H onduras 41 20
N icaragu a 54 21
S o u rce: Saborio  &  M ich a lo p o u lo s  (1 9 9 2 ).
In the case o f Costa Rica the adoption o f the guidelines o f the CACM led to high tariff 
and non-tariff barriers, to a production oriented for the internal market and to a high dispersion in 
the rates o f nominal and effective rates o f protection.
As mentioned in the first section, in 1982 Costa Rica initiated an economic package to 
stabilize the economy followed in 1985 by a structural adjustment programme that sought to spur 
growth by changing the system o f economic incentives. Basic to the structuring o f the reform 
were two key ideas. First, market mechanisms in particular relative prices are not an obstacle to
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growth. Second growth should be based on export promotion. Thus the programme included a 
tariff reform and the implementation o f export subsidies to widen the export base.
At the beginning o f 1986, at the instance o f Costa Rica the General Treaty on Central 
American Economic Integration was revised leading to a modification o f the basic parameters of 
the common external tariff. The ceiling and floor were lowered to 65% and 5% respectively with 
an average o f 21% for the region as a whole.
As part o f its reform programme, Costa Rica replaced the existing combination o f excise 
and a d  valorem  tariff system by a tariff system based only on a d  valorem  tariffs. The tariff 
schedule comprised tariffs within a range o f 1% to 100% (see tables 8 and 9).
T able  8
C O S T A  R IC A : T A R IF F  S C H E D U L E  R E S U L T IN G  F R O M  T H E  1986  R E F O R M
T yp e o f  G ood T ariff R ates
C apital g o o d s and raw m aterials that are not 
produ ced  in  Central A m erica
5% , 10% , 20%  and 30% . In  sp ec if ic  ca se s  tariff  
rates co u ld  b e  lo w ered  to 1%.
C apital g o o d s and raw  m aterials that are produced  
in  Central A m erica
5% , 10% , 20% , 30% . O nly  in  sp ec if ic  ca se s  co u ld  
the ta r iff rate b e  increased  to  30% .
F in a l g o o d s  p rodu ced  in  the reg ion 5% , 25% , 40% , 50% . In sp ec ific  c a se s  su ch  as 
v e h ic le s  and m ed ica tio n s the ta r iff rate reached  
100% . T he ta r iff rates w ere  determ ined  o n  an  
e ffe c t iv e  p ro tectio n  rate b a s is  b e tw e e n  50%  and  
150% .
S o u rce: J im én ez  (1 9 9 7 ); A n n e x  A  o f  the Central A m erica n  Im port D u ty  C od e (1 9 8 6 ).
T ab le  9
C O S T A  R IC A : T A R IF F  D IS T R IB U T IO N , 1986
1986
Im port D u ty  R an ge
N u m b er
W eig h t in  P ercentage o f  
T ota l
0 0 0
1 to 5 65 3 .8
6  to 10 8 2 4 4 8 .1
11 to 20 16 9 .6 9 .9
21 to 30 197 11.5
31 to 40 15 5 .9 9.1
G reater than  40 2 9 2 .9 17.1
T otal 1 713 100
Source: Brenes (1997); Jiménez (1997).
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Despite the reduction in the tariff ceiling and floor the dispersion remained high and the 
rates o f effective protection remained significant. This is shown in table 10 below.
T able  10
C O S T A  R IC A : F R E Q U E N C Y  D IS T R IB U T IO N  O F N O M IN A L  A N D  E F F E C T IV E
P R O T E C T IO N  R A T E S , 1986
T ariff R ate
N o m in a l P ro tection  R ate  
F requency
E ffe c tiv e  P ro tection  R ate  
F requency
G reater than  2 0 0 0 6
F rom  100 to  2 0 0 1 9
F rom  5 0  to  100 9 9
F rom  3 0  to  50 14 5
F rom  10 to  30 12 5
F rom  0 to 10 1 3
S o u rce: M o n g e  (1 9 9 8 ).
During 1986 Costa Rica decided to further reduced import duties applied to the textile 
sector and to a selected group o f final goods. Import duties on clothing, and textiles and other 
related products were reduced from 100% to 65% and from 70% to 45% respectively. These 
measures were implemented in 1987. According to the Academia de Centroamérica, tariff 
dispersion as measured by the standard deviation was reduced from 22 to 19.
The above mentioned reform also included the reduction in import surcharges established 
by the Central Bank. These are described in more detail in the following section.
In 1988, as Costa Rica negotiated a loan from international organizations and prepared for 
a second structural adjustment programme, the authorities passed in 1989 a law (law No. 7134) 
implementing further tariff reductions. The aim was to unify import duties within a framework of 
a 40% a d  valorem  ceiling and a 5% a d  valorem  floor. To this end the authorities could reduce up 
to the limit o f six consecutive semestral reductions all those import duties that were greater than 
40%. In addition they could reduce up to a limit o f 10 consecutive semestral reductions tariffs 
corresponding to footwear, textiles and confections (chapters 50 to 64 o f the Annex A above 
mentioned) when the actual tariff exceeds 40%. Finally, the law stated that the authorities could 
reduce any tariff above 40% to avoid an increase in the effective rates of protection or to establish 
in the case o f inputs, raw materials, and capital goods an ’’adequate tariff structure” . 11 In 
practice, some goods such as automobiles remained with 100% duty rates. Also duty rates on 
clothing, textile and footwear were to be reduced to 40% by 1992. According to Corrales & 
M onge (1990), the reduction o f the ceiling to 40% for most goods unified the effective rates of 
protection for manufacturing while at the same time maintaining a wide dispersion within all the
La Gaceta Diario Oficial, year CXI, Law No. 7134, 1989, p.127.
16
different productive activities. The post 1989 estimated rates o f protection oscillated between 0% 
and greater than 400%.
At the beginning o f the 1990's after Central American countries travelled along different 
commercial routes to achieve structural reform and their progressive incorporation to the GATT, 
they decided to agree on a common external tariff. 12 The common external tariff was to be 
applied by the end o f 1992 within a range o f 5% to 20%. 13 The tariff schedule was adopted 
sequentially along with the Central American tariff code by Costa Rica and with exceptions that 
included among others textiles, clothing, and footwear. In 1992, the tariff ceiling and floor were 
27% and 10% respectively and were expected to be reduced to 20% and 5% by April 1993. The 
import duties on the exceptions above mentioned were to be lowered to 40% in 1992 and 
eventually to 20% in 1995. See table 11.
T able  11
C E N T R A L  A M E R IC A N  T A R IF F  SC H E D U L E , 1991
T yp e o f  g o o d T a r iff rate
C apital g o o d s  and raw m aterial n o t p rodu ced  in  
Central A m erica
5
C apital g o o d s  and raw m aterial p rodu ced  in  Central 
A m erica
10
F in a l g o o d s  p rodu ced  in  Central A m erica 15
F in a l g o o d s  n ot p rodu ced  in  Central A m erica 20
Source: C o n sejo  M onetario  C entroam ericano (1 9 9 3 ).
By the end o f 1992 and in comparison to pre-reform (1984) the average rate of protection 
was reduced substantially. Indeed, following Corden's methodology M onge (1997) estimated that 
a for a selected group o f manufacturing activities (measured at the chapter, four digit, level) the 
effective rate o f protection decreased from 1 421.6 in 1984 to 29.1. As well for the same sample 
the dispersion was estimated at 2 098.1 in 1984 and at 69.4 in 1992. However, the same author 
found a significant and positive correlation, measured by the Spearman correlation rank 
coefficient, between protection levels in 1986 and 1992 indicating that the trade liberalization 
policy from 1986 to 1992 was set out in a form that would lessen the cost borne by domestic 
industry due to the increase in imports. In fact, the import structure from 1986 on is almost 
invariant to the trade liberalization efforts (see table 12).
12 Some authors state that in 1992 Central America reverted to a common external tariff (see, 
Saborio & Michalopoulos). However this is not correct. Prior to 1992 Central America countries had 
agreed on a tariff code but not on a common external tariff.




COSTA RICA: IMPORT STRUCTURE, 1986-1993
(P ercen tages)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
N o n  D urab le co n su m er g o o d s 15 14 16 16 16 16 16 17
D urab le  con su m er g o o d s 6 6 6 6 8 6 10 12
O il products 4 4 5 5 7 8 7 6
R a w  m ateria ls and  interm ediate  
g o o d s  fo r  agriculture
5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5
R a w  m ateria ls and  interm ediate  
g o o d s  fo r  m anufacturing
41 42 4 4 44 37 38 35 33
C on struction  m ateria ls 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3
C apital g o o d s fo r  agriculture 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C apital g o o d s  fo r  m anufacturing 16 16 14 15 17 15 16 15
Transport equ ip m ent 7 8 5 6 6 5 6 7
O ther 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
T ota l 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
S o u rce: M o n g e  &  G o n zá lez  (1 9 9 5 ); M o n g e  &  L iza n o  (1 9 9 7 ).
W hile from 1986 to 1994, the authorities carried out a systematic policy o f tariff reduction 
and trade liberalization in general from 1994 on the trade liberalization policy is often subject to 
stop and go cycles and even revert and proceed cycles. The causes to the change in policy regime 
are attributed in some instances to the dominating interests o f power groups. 14 However, it is 
also possible that the fiscal constraint, partly due to import liberalization and export promotion, 
started to became a binding constraint. Indeed as shown in another section in 1994, the 
consolidated financial deficit reversed its decreasing trend that started in 1990.
The year 1994 saw an increase in the level o f effective protection. The factors 
contributing to this increase are the above mentioned reduction in the floor of the tariff floor from 
10% to 5%; decreases in import duties applied to inputs and raw materials (agricultural inputs 
and vehicle parts) and increases in import taxes charged on final goods (clothing, meat, beans, 
rice, potatoes and other vegetables). In addition, Costa Rica following GATT legislation changed 
non tariff trade barriers for tariff barriers. These will be addressed in the next section.
In 1995 Costa Rica, implemented a temporary six month (March to September) increase 
o f 8 percentage points on all duty rates applied to imported products to increase fiscal revenue
14 In fact some economists identify this characteristic as almost the most permanent feature in 
Costa Rican history. See González & Vega (1995), pp. 14-26.
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and thus decrease the burdening budget deficit. This measure was abolished as the sales tax rate 
increased in September o f that year from 10% to 15%.
During 1995 and 1996, the Central American countries, at the instance o f El Salvador, 
fixed new goals for tariff reductions. The new range is confined to 0% and 15%. The basic rates 
are 0% for capital goods and raw materials that are not produced in the region, 5% and 10% for 
raw materials and inputs produced in the region and 15% for final goods. All countries agreed to 
arrive at this common external tariff by the year 2000 but with individual tariff reduction 
itineraries. The tariff reduction schedule for Costa Rica is shown in table 13.
T able  13
C O S T A  R IC A : T A R IF F  R E D U C T IO N  SC H E D U L E , 1996
1996 1997 1998 1999
January July D ecem b er January D ecem b er January D ecem b er January D ecem b er
C apital G ood s 5% 3% 2% 1% 0%
R a w  m aterials 5% 1%
Interm ediate g o o d s  
10%
8% 7% 6% 5%
Interm ediate g o o d s  
10%
13% 12% 11% 10%
F in a l g o o d s 20% 18% 17% 16% 15%
S o u rce: SIE C A  (1 9 9 6 ).
Following its tariff schedule Costa Rica reduced its import duty on capital goods and raw 
materials from 5% to 3% and 1% respectively (this meant the reduction o f the tariff floor from 
5% to 1%). The country also implemented several other tariff reduction measures (see table 14). 
However, as the consolidated budget deficit increased by two percentage points from 1995 
reaching 5% of GDP towards the end o f 1996, the authorities decided to put the tariff reduction 
schedule on hold.
In 1997, the authorities renewed their commitment to Central American integration and 
agreed on a new tariff schedule which is presently being followed (see table 15). According to the 
present schedule Costa Rica will comply with the Central American Common External Tariff by 
the year 2000, although some agricultural products will adjust to the schedule by the year 2005.
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T able  14
C O S T A  R IC A : SE L E C T E D  T A R IF F  R E G IM E  M E A S U R E S  IM P L E M E N T E D  IN  1996
i) A  3%  ta r iff rate red uction  fo r  cap ital g o od s.
ii) A  5%  ta r iff rates o n  tw e e d  to  enhan ce  the c o m p etitiv en ess o f  the tex tile  industry.
iii) A  red uction  in  im port duties a p p lied  to raw m ateria ls u sed  in  the produ ction  o f  cardboard b o x e s  
to lo w e r  the export co sts  o f  bananas.
iv) R ed u ctio n  in  ta r iff rates a p p lied  to  c h ick en  sau sage fro m  2 79%  to  54% .
v ) E stab lish m en t o f  a  u n iform  ta r iff fo r  on ion s.
v i) R ed u ctio n  in  ta r iff rates to  1% ap p licab le  to  agricultural and industrial inputs to revam p national 
production .
Source: A c a d em ia  de C entroam érica  (1 9 9 7 ).
T ab le  15
C O S T A  R IC A : T A R IF F  R E D U C T IO N  SC H E D U L E , 1998  
(P ercen tages)





2 0 0 0
C apital g o o d s 5 2 1 0
R a w  m ateria ls 5 0
Interm ediate g o o d s 10 9 8 7 6 5
Interm ediate g o o d s 15 14 13 12 11 10
F in a l g o o d s 2 0 19 18 17 16 15
S o u rce: S IE C A  (1 9 9 8 ); M in istry  o f  C om m erce  o f  C osta  R ic a  (1 9 9 9 ).
As it stands, in July 1999 Costa Rica applies a 0% import duty rate on imported capital 
goods and raw materials that are not produced in the region, a 6% and 11% on intermediate 
goods and a 16% import tax on final goods. The country needs one more round o f reductions 
which will take place in January 2000 to arrive at the common external tariff goals.
Table 16 summarizes the significance and extent o f trade liberalization by showing the 
evolution o f the tariff rate distribution between 1986 and 1999. Taking both end data points and 
the tariff range extremes as references, it can be seen that in 1986 no products were subject to a 
0% nominal tariff rate. In 1999 48% of all imported goods enter Costa Rica on an import tariff
20
rate free basis. In 1986, 17% of all imported goods were subject to tariff rates higher than 41%. In 
1999, that percentage has been reduced to 1.13%. These are the so called safeguard clauses and 
apply basically to agricultural products, textiles, footwear and vehicles. However, less drastic are 
the changes in the tariff distribution for middle tariff range values. In 1986, 58% of the total of 
imported products fell within a 6%-20% tariff range. By 1999, that figure decreased to 44%.
T able 16
C O S T A  R IC A : P E R C E N T  D IS T R IB U T IO N  O F T H E  T A R IF F  S C H E D U L E , 1 9 8 6 -1 9 9 9
1986 1987 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
0% 2 9 .8 4 8 .3
1% to  5% 3 .8 3 .6 2 .4 2 .7 1.9 5 0 .8 5 1 .7 14 .4 5 2 .1 2 3 .5 5 .9 8
6%  to 10% 4 8 .1 4 7 .8 5 7 .2 5 9 .8 6 3 .4 13 .7 14 .6 7 .5 14.1 14.5 14 .4
11%  to  20% 9 .9 10.1 16.3 2 2 .6 2 7 .0 2 5 .7 2 6 .7 2 6 .7 2 6 .1 30 .3 2 9 .9
21%  to  30% 11.5 11 .6 8.3 12.5 2 .4 2 .8 6 .0 5 .8 0 .5 0 .0 2
31%  to  40% 9.1 10 .7 13 .9 2 .2 5 .2 3.3 0 .7 0 .2 0 .3 0 .3 2
G reater than  41% 17.6 15 .8 2 .1 0 .3 0 .1 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.14 1.13
T ota l 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
S o u rce: J im én ez  (1 9 9 9 ); M o n g e  (1 9 9 7 ).
5. Non-tariff trade barriers and other import taxes
Prior to the 1986 reform non-tariff barriers were a pervasive feature o f the Costa Rican economy. 
These included import surcharges, import deposits, quotas and licenses and permits.
The import surcharge was applied on a temporal basis to inputs and final goods imported 
from outside the Central American region for balance o f payments reasons. The revenue from 
this tax was captured by the Central Bank and it granted exemptions when the net result o f a 
given foreign trade transaction had a positive effect on the balance o f payments. The reform 
reduced import surcharges as these were set between 0% and 2% for inputs and between 12.5% 
and 100% for final goods. Vehicles however maintained a 3% to 150% import surcharge range. 
From 1987 to 1991 the Central Bank import surcharge had a non negligible weight in tax revenue 
collection. In 1991, it represented 8.1% of current revenue and 1.1% of GDP. 15 In 1992, the 
central Bank import surcharge was declared unconstitutional.
The reform also eliminated the import surcharge established in the San José Protocol. 
These surcharges comprised a 30% tax applied to the total value o f import duties that were paid 
on any given import with the exception o f so called basic need products.
Brenes (1997).
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Import deposits referred to a given percentage o f the cif value o f a given import product 
that must be deposited by the importer in order to obtain foreign currency from the Central Bank 
to carry out a foreign trade transaction. The operation could well take up to two months. From 
1985 to 1987, import deposits were reduced from 100% to 10% for inputs and raw materials, 
capital goods and construction materials. They were finally eliminated in 1992.
Licenses and permits were applied basically to the imports o f agricultural products (rice, 
chicken parts, milk products, tobacco, cheese) and also to manufactured goods (textiles). The 
reform maintained initially import permits especially in the case o f agricultural products. Import 
permits for agricultural products were basically monopolized by the National Production Council. 
This was justified on the grounds o f a lack o f internal supply to satisfy demand.
Following Costa R ica's adhesion to GATT (1989) and within the framework o f the 
Uruguay Round the country eliminated in 1994 all licenses and permits. The elimination o f these 
non-tariff barriers affected among others pork products, rice, wheat, beans, tobacco, sugar cane 
and sugar, salt, milk products textiles, coffee. 16 N on-tariff barriers on these products were 
replaced by tariffs which were negotiated to a range of 55%-274%. 17 The country also agreed to 
reduce these tariff rates between 1995 and 2000. However, the evolution o f tariff rate reduction 
for some o f these products has been somewhat slow. This is shown in table 17 for the period 
January 1996 and July 1999.
T able  17
E V O L U T IO N  O F T A R IF F  R A T E S  F O R  S E L E C T E D  P R O D U C T S . J A N U A R Y  1 9 9 6 -J U L Y  1999
January
1996












T ex tile s 25 25 25 25 23 19 20
B ea n s 30
F o o tw ea r 31 27 27 2 7 27 24 20
Sugar 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
R ice 55 35 35 35 35 35 35
M ilk  products 109 109 106 106 105 105 96
C h ick en  m eat and  parts 2 7 0 2 7 0 2 6 2 2 6 2 2 5 8 2 5 8 4 7 -5 5
S o u rce: J im én ez  (1 9 9 9 ).
Decree No. 7473 La Gaceta No.246. December 27, 1994.
17 GATT regulations allowed the replacement of non tariff barriers by tariff rates because it was 
deemed a more transparent instrument. These tariffs could not be above the GATT consolidated tariffs. 
However, they were higher than the Central American uniform tariff ceiling.
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W ithin this set, milk products and chicken parts are also subject to tariff quotas which will 
be progressively reduced (these are shown in Table 18). The Bolsa de Productos Agropecuarios,
S.A. (BOLPRO) administers and distributes licenses and permits to import these products.
T able 18
C O S T A  R IC A . T A R IF F  Q U O T A S
P roduct Y ea r V o lu m e  in  m etric tons Im port duty
C h ick en  parts 1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 2 9 9 9 -1  170 34%
O ther c h ick en  parts 1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 2 1 1 8 -1 3 7 19%
M ilk  products 1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 2 3 1 5 -3 6 9 34%
B utter 1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 2 3 5 -4 1 34%
C h eese 1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 2 2 9 2 -3 4 2 34%
Ice cream 1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 2 5 6 4 -6 6 1 39%
S o u rce: M in istry  o f  F o re ig n  trade (1 9 9 9 ).
Costa Rica still maintains other taxes on imports. These are basically three a 1% tax on all 
imports (initially this tax rate was 3% and was reduced to 1% in 1983), a sales tax and a number 
o f excise taxes. The sales tax is applied to the added value generated in the national or imported 
merchandise transaction and in service rendering. This sales tax rate increased from 10% to 13% 
in 1991, and decreased by 1 percentage points in 1992, 1993, and 1994. In 1995 the sales tax rate 
was increased to 15% for 18 months. Since May 1997, the rate is 13%.
Excise duties are applied to commercial transactions o f a specific set of final consumer 
goods. As indicated by law, the executive power has the right to modify excise duty tax rates up 
to 200% and to incorporate as well new products to the list o f products subject to excise taxes. 
Excise duties comprise in fact a wide variety o f rates that have often been subject to important 
variations. Excise taxes affect 24% of imported products (see table for a list o f the products and 
the corresponding import rates). However, according to Brenes (1997) 11 products generate 85% 
of excise tax revenue (see table 19).
The 1% tax is applied to the cif import value and its proceeds are used for social and 
medical purposes. Following recent trade negotiations, only M exican and Panamanian import 
products are exempted from the payment o f this tax. Excise taxes are levied on a base that 
includes the cif import value plus import duties and the 1% import tax . Finally, the sales tax is 




C O S T A  R IC A : P E R C E N T  W E IG H T  IN  T O T A L  E X C IS E  T A X  R E V E N U E  O F  
A  SE L E C T E D  L IS T  O F G O O D S  A N D  T A X  R A T E
Product
P ercentage  o f  total 
ta x  revenue  
(1 9 9 3 )
T a x  rate (1 9 9 6 )
V e h ic le s 4 3 .6 40; 50; 63
B e er 9 .6 45
C igarettes 8 .0 70
T ex tile s 6 .0 15
D o m e stic  ap p lian ces 3 .8 0; 10; 15
S o ft drinks 3 .4 30
L iquors 2 .7 40; 45; 60
C o sm etics  and  perfum e 2 .6 30
P ain t 2 .6 20
T ires 1.6 15
D eterg en ts 1.3 15
Subtotal 8 5 .2
O ther m erchan d ises 14 .8
T otal 100
M ea n 19.6
M a x im u m -M in im u m 0 -7 5
D isp er s io n 13 .6
S o u rce: B ren es (1 9 9 7 ); M in istry  o f  F in an ce  (1 9 9 9 ).
Finally besides consular rights, in very specific cases there exist two other taxes, the 
IFAM and the IIDA taxes. The IFAM  tax rate is 10% and is applied to alcoholic beverages, some 
types of bottled water and cigarettes. The IIDA tax rate is set at 2.5% for cigarettes, 5% for beer, 
and 8% to 14% for spirited beverages. The IFAM and IIDA tax apply to both imported and 
national products. 18
6. Export taxes and export trade barriers
Prior to the 1986 economic package both non-traditional and traditional exports (coffee, banana, 
meat and sugar) 19 were subject to taxes. The aim o f traditional export activity taxation was the 
transfer of foreign currency earnings from the agricultural to the manufacturing sector as required 
by the import substitution strategy.
At the beginning o f the 1980's export taxes represented 33% of total revenue. The reform 
sought to eliminate taxes on non traditional exports and reduce those taxes applied on traditional 
exports. Between 1987 and 1996, the weight o f export taxes in total revenue decreased from 8%
18 Consular rights were in 1998 to be 160 dollars. IFAM stands for Impuesto de Fomento y  
Asesoría Municipal. IIDA means Impuesto de Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario.
19 Prior to 1960, traditional exports comprised basically coffee and bananas.
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to 2%. Implicit tariff rate estimations on traditional exports show a decrease from 12% in 1987 to 
2.1% in 1998 (see Graph 4). Currently only coffee and bananas generate non negligible revenues 
although, as will become evident in a further section, their contribution to total tax and fiscal 
revenue is far from being significant.
Coffee export is taxed on an a d  valorem  basis following a set schedule which has been 
modified over the years according to the evolution o f world coffee prices (see Table 25). The 
banana export tax is levied on the banana export box. The tariff rate also varies with international 
prices. In 1997, the authorities decided to implement a 1 US dollar tax per exported box. 
However, out o f that dollar only 0.30 cents were to be levied starting January 1996 the rest was 
added to minimum export banana price. This amount was to be progressively reduced up to 0.04 
cents by the year 2003. 20
G raph 4
C O S T A  R IC A : IM P L IC IT  T A R IF F  R A T E  E S T IM A T IO N  O N  










S o u rce: E stim ated  o n  the b a s is  o f  E C L A C  (1 9 9 9 )  and M in istry  o f  
F in ance o f  C osta  R ica  (1 9 9 9 ).
7. Export promotion policies
Parallel to the reduction in tariff rates which were sought to conform to market allocating 
mechanisms, Costa Rican authorities sought to revamp non traditional exports by adopting 
interventionist policies. These policies were viewed as necessary to compensate for the anti bias 
export that characterized the import substitution period. They consisted basically in granting 
direct subsidy and other type o f incentives to non-traditional exporters. In particular these 
policies comprised: (i) real exchange rate devaluations; (ii) import duty exemption on capital and 
raw materials necessary to carry out export producing activities; (iii) income tax exemption for a 
given set o f activities; (iv) an export subsidy equivalent to a given amount o f the value o f exports. 
This instrument is known as CAT, Tax Redemption Certificate (Certificado de Abono Tributario
Years
20 Sugar is taxed on a similar basis as coffee.
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in Spanish). Both (ii) and (iii) were included in export regimes such as temporal admission and 
free trade zones; and (i) (ii) and (iii) were part o f the regime known as the export contract.
T able  2 0
C O S T A  R IC A : C O F FE E  E X P O R T  T A X , 1991 , 1992 , 1995 , 1997
Y ea r W orld  P rice  in  U S  $ T ariff R ate A d d itio n a l ta x es
1991 L e ss  than 93 




1992 L e ss  than 93 
B e tw e e n  9 3 -1 9 1  





1995 L e ss  than 92 0% F rom  O ctob er  1995 ,
B e tw e e n  9 2 -1 0 0 1% 1.5%  o n  the fob  va lu e  o f
B e tw e e n  1 0 0 -1 1 0 3% g o ld e n  c o ffe e  o f  46
B e tw e e n  1 1 0 -1 2 0 6% k ilo s.
B e tw e e n  1 2 0 -1 3 0 7%
B e tw e e n  1 3 0 -1 4 0 8%
B e tw e e n  1 4 0 -1 5 0 9%
B e tw e e n  1 5 0 -1 6 0 10%
B e tw e e n  1 6 0 -1 7 0 11%
G reater than 170 12%
1997 A d  valorem  tax. T he ad  valorem  
ta x  sh a ll not e x c e e d  1% o n  the fob  
v a lu e  o f  exports and w il l  b e  
im p lem en ted  w h en  the  
international price  per c o ffe e  b a g  
o f  4 6  k ilo s  e x ce ed s  92
1.5%  o n  the exported  
v a lu e
Source: C o n sejo  M onetario  C entroam ericano, V arious issu es  1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 7 .
The export contract is established for a twelve year period for firms whose value added in 
their production process exceeds 35%. The amount allowed by the CAT that a non traditional 
exporter can receive is increased to a vary within a range o f 15% to 30% of the export fob value. 
In addition this import regime allowed tax exemptions on capital and imported raw materials as 
well as exemptions to the income tax. According to M onge & Rosales (1999) this regime 
accounted for 13% of the value o f non-traditional exports in 1986.
The temporal admission regime, was created in 1972, but firmly established in 1984. The 
idea underlying this instrument was to facilitate the establishment o f maquiladora firms 
producing textiles. Temporal admission was established for periods o f three months to five years.
The export contract and the temporal admission regime jointly with the free trade zone 
were the cornerstone o f export promotion policy. The former two regimes were replaced in 1996 
by the Régimen Devolutivo de Derechos and by the Régimen de Perfeccionamiento Activo. The 
new regimes also grant tax exemption. However, these do not contemplate the issuing o tax 
redemption certificates. (See table 21).
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Table 21
EXPORT PROMOTION REGIMES, 1984-PRESENT
In co m e T ax Im port d u ties O ther im port ta x es C A T
In co m e tax
1984-1996
i)  E xport C ontract
In com e ta x  ex em p tio n s  
up to tw e lv e  years  
(1 9 9 6 ). T h ey  apply to 
firm s that w ere  adm itted  
to operate under th is  
reg im e prior to  1992 .
N o t  ex em p ted  from  the  
p aym en t o f  the in co m e  
tax.
D ep en d in g  o n  the  
lo ca tio n  and type o f  
firm s ex em p tio n s from  
the paym en t o f  the  
in c o m e  tax  ca n  b e  
granted fo r  a  sp ec ific  
p eriod  o f  tim e.
E xon erated  fro m  the  
p ay m en t o f  im port duties  
w h e n  im ports are 
necessa ry  fo r  export 
p roduction .
E xon erated  fro m  the  
p ay m en t o f  im port duties  
w h e n  im ports are 
necessa ry  fo r  export 
p roduction .
A p p lies  to  firm s that 
w ere  adm itted  to operate  
under the export contract 
reg im e prior to  1992 .
i i)  T em poral A d m iss io n
E xonerated  fro m  im port 
d u ties in  the produ ction  
o f  a ll m erchan dise  for  
export.
E xon erated  from  other  
im port ta x es in  the  
p rodu ction  o f  a ll 
m erchan d ise  fo r  export.
iii)  F ree Trade Z o n es
E x em p ted  from  the  
p ay m en t o f  im port 
duties.
E x em p ted  from  the  
p aym en t o f  o ther im port 
ta x es and  charges.
1996 onwards
i)  D ra w b a ck  rights reg im e  
T h is reg im es rep laces the tem p oral a d m iss io n  reg im e
Sam e as tem p oral a d m iss io n  
reg im e________________________
Im port D u tie s
Sam e as tem p oral a d m iss io n  
reg im e________________________
O ther im port ta x es and charges





In co m e tax
Sam e as free  trade zo n e  
regu la tion  during the 1 9 8 4 -1 9 8 6  
export p ro m o tio n  period .
Im port D u tie s
ii)  Perfeccionam iento activo
E xonerated  from  the paym en t o f  
im port duties. A fter  im port 
m erch an d ises m u st b e  re-exported  
fo l lo w in g  a  transform ation  
p ro cess or incorporated into other  
exp orted  m erchan d ise  w ith in  a 
sp ec ifie d  per iod  o f  tim e.
iii) Free trade zo n es
Sam e as free  trade zo n e  
regu la tion  during the 1 9 8 4 -1 9 8 6  
export p ro m o tio n  period .
O ther im port ta x es and charges
E xonerated  from  the paym en t o f  
im port ta x es and other charges. 
A fter  im port m erchan d ises m ust 
b e  re-exported  fo llo w in g  a 
transform ation  p ro cess or  
incorporated into other exported  
m erchan d ise  w ith in  a  sp ec ified  
p eriod  o f  tim e.
Sam e as free  trade zo n e  
regu la tion  during the 1 9 8 4 -1 9 8 6  
export p ro m o tio n  period .
S o u rce: A ca d em ia  de C entroam érica  (1 9 9 7 ); O ffice  fo r  the P ro m o tio n  o f  F o re ig n  Trade in  C osta  R ica  
(P R O C O M E R ) (1 9 9 8 ).
N o te : F ree trade zo n e  reg im es a lso  exonerate  producers from  the p ay m en t o f  other ta x es su ch  as the sa les  
ta x  and  the co n su m p tio n  tax.
From a fiscal point o f view the most important and influential element was without doubt 
the CAT. Due to their fiscal cost and with the aim o f furthering reforms aimed at market 
mechanisms, the CAT as an export promotion instrument was planned to be progressively 
eliminated during the 1990's as mentioned above.
First, new CATs are issued which are valid for amounts less than 15% and up until 1996. 
Second, in 1992 the authorities propose to the export sector two types o f options for CATs: an 
extension o f the period o f validity o f CATs was extended until 1999 for those firms accepting a 
30% voluntary reduction in the application o f the incentive; impose a 25% tax on the nominal 
value of the CAT from 1992 up until 1996.
Graph 5 shows the government expenditure corresponding to CAT and its weight in total 
government expenditure. It can be seen that although the importance o f the CAT has diminished. 
Still the CATs represented on average 4% of total central government expenditure on average 
from 1985 to 1997. Moreover, despite its elimination during the 1990's as an export promotion 
policy, the central government will still incur into CAT expenditures until the year 2002 (due to 
their eighteen month maturation period), and the highest CAT expenditure ratio to total 
government revenue will be recorded, according to the ministry o f finance estimations, in the 
year 2001.
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C O S T A  R IC A : C A T S  A S  A  P E R C E N T A G E  O F G O V E R N M E N T  




S o u rce: M in istry  o f  F in an ce  o f  C osta  R ic a  (1 9 9 9 );  E C L A C  (1 9 9 9 );  M in istry  o f  N a tio n a l 
P lan n in g  and E c o n o m ic  P o lic y  (M ID E P L A N ) (1 9 9 8 ).
8. Trade taxes, export promotion policies and fiscal performance
As indicated above, during the decade o f the eighties and nineties, trade liberalization policies 
were accompanied by government intervention to enhance export growth. Trade liberalization, 
through the progressive reduction in import duties and other import charges as well as export 
taxes, affected basically the revenue side o f government finance. Government intervention, 
mainly through the issuance o f CAT certificates, affected the expenditure side o f the central 
government fiscal accounts. The importance or weight o f these components for fiscal 
performance can be readily seen by separating both the revenue and the expenditure side o f the 
fiscal accounts in an internal and external component. Tables 23 through 25 show this 
decomposition in averages for expressed as a percentage o f total revenue and expenditure and as 
a percentage o f GDP respectively. Due to differences in available data the revenue decomposition 
is carried out for the period 1983-2002 whereas the expenditure decomposition is shown for the 
years 1985-2002.
The revenue decomposition shows that the external sources of revenue have slightly 
decreased their weight in total central government revenue in favour o f internal sources. This is 
the product o f a simultaneous increase in the revenue yielded by the external selective tax but 





COSTA RICA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME BY SELECTED CATEGORY
AS A % OF TOTAL REVENUE, 1983-2002
1983 1 9 8 6 -1 9 9 0 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 4 1 9 9 4 -1 9 9 8 1 9 9 8 -2 0 0 2
Internal sources of revenue 49.6 48.1 51.3 54.4
In co m e tax 18.1 14 .8 15 .4 17 .9 2 0 .6
Internal sa le s  tax 11.1 13.1 17 .0 17 .9 17 .0
Internal se lec tiv e  con su m p tio n 8.1 7 .2 5 .9 5 .9 5 .9
ta x
S p ec ia l c o n su m p tio n  tax 0 .0 3 .0 0 .8 0 .5 3.1
P roperty in co m e 1.3 0 .7 0 .1 0 .0 0 .0
T ransfer in co m e 0 .0 3 .6 1.3 0 .9 0 .2
O ther 7 .1 7 .6 8.3 7 .5
External sources of revenue 49.3 50.9 48.3 45.3
E xternal sa le s  tax 9 .9 12 .8 16 .8 19 .7 2 1 .0
E xternal se lec tiv e  con su m p tio n 5 .6 7 .4 9 .0 11 .6 14 .0
ta x
Im port revenue 11.3 2 0 .5 2 1 .2 14.3 8 .9
Im port d u ties 5 .6 15 .6 16 .8 13 .2 11 .7
S an  José P rotoco l 1.7 0 .0 0 .0 -0 .6 -4 .7
Im port surcharges 3 .8 2 .7 2 .5 0 .0 0 .0
O thers 0 .0 2 .3 1.9 1.7 2 .0
E xport revenue 2 3 .3 8 .4 3 .5 2 .1 1.0
A d  valorem  c o ffe e  tax 4 .1 3 .2 0 .2 0 .6 0 .2
O ther ad  valorem  taxes 2 .9 0 .5 0 .6 0 .4 0 .4
T a x  o n  c o ffe e  profits 3 .5 2 .7 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0
B anan a 8 .2 1.7 2 .5 1.1 0 .4
O ther 0 .2 0 .1 0 .0 0 .0
S o u rce: M in istry  o f  fin an ce  (1 9 8 4  &  19 9 9 ) and tab le  2 8  in  appendix .
Export taxes have consistently decreased in importance relative to other external taxes within the 
period considered. Export taxes represented 23.3% of total fiscal revenue in 1983. By 1986-1990, 
and 1994-1998, this figure had decreased to 3.5% and 2.1% respectively. The authorities also 
estimate a further decrease during 1998-2002 (1%). Measured in terms o f GDP, exports revenue 
represented 3.9% in 1983; by 1998-2002 export revenues will have decreased to 0.2% of GDP. 
The evolution of these taxes reflect from fiscal perspective, clearly and unilaterally, the change in 
the import substitution regime. regime that prevailed to the end o f the 1970's. As noted earlier the 
import substitution strategy required foreign exchange to develop the manufacturing or industrial 
sector. The foreign exchange to transferred from the traditional export activities via a 
straightforward tax type or through a system o f multiple exchange rates. Once the import 
substitution path to development is abandoned, export taxes become redundant.
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Table 23
COSTA RICA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME BY SELECTED CATEGORY
AS A % OF GDP, 1983-2002
1983 1 9 8 6 -1 9 9 0 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 4 1 9 9 4 -1 9 9 8 1 9 9 8 -2 0 0 2
Internal sources of revenue 7.6 7.3 8.4 9.8
In co m e tax 2 .9 2 .3 2 .3 2 .9 3 .7
Internal sa le s  tax 1.8 2 .0 2 .6 2 .9 3.1
Internal se le c t iv e  co n su m p tio n  tax 1.3 1.1 0 .9 1.0 1.1
S p ec ia l c o n su m p tio n  tax 0 .1 0 .5 0 .1 0 .1 0 .6
Property in co m e 0 .2 0 .1 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0
T ransfer in co m e 0 .0 0 .6 0 .2 0 .1 0 .0
O ther 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.4
External sources of revenue 7.5 7.7 7.9 8.2
E xternal sa le s  tax 1.7 1.9 2 .5 3 .2 3 .8
E xternal se lec tiv e  co n su m p tio n  tax 0 .9 1.1 1.4 1.9 2 .5
Im port revenue 1.9 3.1 3 .2 2 .3 1.6
Im port d u ties 0 .9 2 .4 2 .5 2 .1 2 .1
S an  José P rotoco l 0 .3 0 .0 0 .0 -0 .1 -0 .9
Im port surcharges 0 .6 0 .4 0 .4 0 .0 0 .0
O thers 0 .0 0 .4 0 .3 0 .3 0 .4
E xport revenue 3 .9 1.3 0 .5 0 .3 0 .2
A d  valorem  c o ffe e  tax 0 .7 0 .5 0 .0 0 .1 0 .0
O ther ad  valorem  taxes 0 .5 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1
T a x  o n  c o ffe e  profits 0 .6 0 .4 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0
B anan a 1.4 0 .3 0 .4 0 .2 0 .1
O ther 0 .0 0 .1 0 .0 0 .0
S o u rce: M in istry  o f  fin a n ce  (1 9 8 4  &  19 9 9 ) and tab le 2 8  in  appendix .
The external sales tax proceeds have steadily increased form 9.9% in 1983 to 19.7% for 
1994-1998 and are expected to increase still by the year 2002. This is the product o f increases in 
the sales tax rate and o f an import base that has been enlarged by trade liberalization measures. 
The sales tax rate applies which applies to both domestic and imported goods has increased from 
8% in 1982, 10% in 1987, 12% in 1991 and 15% in 1995 and 13% in 1997. This increase in turn 
not only raises external tax revenue but also internal tax revenue. In this way, a decrease in 
external sales tax revenue due to a fall in imports can always be compensated by internal revenue 
side o f the sales tax.
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Table 24
COSTA RICA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE BY SELECTED CATEGORY
AS A % OF TOTAL EXPENDITURE, 1983-2002
1985 1 9 8 6 -1 9 9 0 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 4 1 9 9 4 -1 9 9 8 1 9 9 8 -2 0 0 2
Internal sources of expenditure 90.7 91.6 91 92.7 91.4
W a g es and  salaries 31 .1 3 1 .6 2 9 .8 2 7 .7 2 9 .2
P en sio n s 9 .9 10 .9 12 .4 13 .6
O ther 3 7 .8 2 6 .3 18 .0 16 .9
Interest o n  internal debt 4 .6 9 .4 15 .4 2 1 .3 11.1
B a n k in g  c o m m issio n s 0 .4 1.4 1.5 1.1
F E E S  transfer 8.1 7 .9 7 .3 6 .2 5 .9
F O D E S A F  transfer 3.1 3 .4 4 .7 4 .2
O ther transfers 5 .5 3 .5 4 .7 4 .2
External sources of expenditure 9.3 8.9 9.8 7.2 8.6
Interests o n  external debt 7 .4 4 .7 5 .0 3.1 4 .2
C A T 1.9 4 .2 4 .9 4 .2 4 .4
S o u rce: M in istry  o f  fin a n ce  (1 9 8 4  &  19 9 9 ) and tab le 2 9  appendix .
N o te : F .E .E .S  =  S p ec ia l h igh er  ed u ca tio n  fund.
F O D E S A F  =  S o c ia l d ev e lo p m en t and fa m ily  a ss ig n m en t fund. 
F or 1985 P en sio n s  are in c lu d ed  under the ca tegory  Other.
T ab le  25
C O S T A  R IC A : C E N T R A L  G O V E R N M E N T  E X P E N D IT U R E  B Y  S E L E C T E D  C A T E G O R Y
A S  A  % O F G D P , 1 9 8 3 -2 0 0 2
1985 1 9 8 6 -1 9 9 0 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 4 1 9 9 4 -1 9 9 8 1 9 9 8 -2 0 0 2
Internal sources of 16.1 14.6 16.3 19.3 18.7
expenditure
W a g es and  salaries 5 .5 5 .6 5 .5 5 .8 6 .0
P en sio n s 2 .1 2 .6 2 .8
O ther 6 .7 4 .7 3.3 2 .8
Interest o n  internal debt 0 .8 1.7 2 .8 4 .4 2 .3
B a n k in g  c o m m issio n s 0 .1 0 .2 0 .2 0 .2
F E E S  transfer 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2
F O D E S A F  transfer 0 .5 0 .5 0 .5 0 .5 0 .5
O ther transfers 0 .8 0 .6 0 .9 0 .7
External sources of 1.7 1.6 1.8 0.6 1.8
expenditure
Interests o n  external debt 1.3 0 .8 0 .9 0 .6 0 .9
C A T 0.3 0 .8 0 .9 0 .9 0 .9
S o u rce: M in istry  o f  fin a n ce  (1 9 8 4  &  19 9 9 ) and tab le 2 9  in  appendix .
N o te  F .E .E .S  =  S p ec ia l h igh er  ed u ca tio n  fund.
F O D E S A F  =  S o c ia l d ev e lo p m en t and fa m ily  a ss ig n m en t fund.
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From this analysis it can be seen that the trade liberalization policy followed by Costa 
Rica with some interruptions since 1985 has diminished the dependency o f fiscal accounts on 
export taxes and have considerably lowered the importance o f the effect o f commodity price 
fluctuation on fiscal performance.
However import revenues have actually increased their weight in total revenue (11.3% in 
1983 and 14.3 for 1994-1998). While import surcharges have been abolished import duties 
account for 13% of revenue in 1994-1998. In fact, comparing the year 1983 with the follow up 
period (1986-1990), import duties increased threefold. This fact resulted form both an increase in 
the import tax base as merchandise import was liberalized and due to a shift in the income 
elasticity o f imports since from 1985 on.. Preliminary estimations show that the income elasticity 
o f imports between 1970 and 1985 was 1.03 and between 1985 and 1997 1.45. Graph 6 shows the 
decreasing trend in import tariffs and the increasing trend in import tariff revenue.
Graph 6
AVERAGE IMPORT TARIFF RATE AND IMPORT DUTY 
REVENUE, 1984-1998
YEARS
S o u rce: W T O  (1 9 9 6 ); E C L A C  (1 9 9 9 ).
On the revenue side CAT will still have a fiscal impact up until the year 2002 which 
marks the maturation period o f the CATs whose validity was extended in 1999. So far CAT 
expenditure has represented 4.4% of total expenditure and 0.9% of GDP. The elimination of 
CATs will obviously provide a source o f fiscal relief and a financial basis for further tariff 
reduction without endangering fiscal equilibrium. In this sense the authorities are planning to 
further reduce the tariff rate ceiling to 13.5% in 2000, 11.5% in 2001 and to 10% in the year 
2002.
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In 1981 and 1982 GDP registered negative rates o f growth averaging -4.8%. In 1985 a 
comprehensive stabilization cum  structural adjustment programme was undertaken. Stabilization 
measures were aimed at restoring basic macroeconomic equilibria. Structural adjustment 
objectives centred on long run economic reforms. These included a government, financial and 
trade policy reforms.
Trade reform combined a mix o f free market policy with state intervention to foster export 
growth. Free market policies were understood to mean mostly import price liberalization through 
tariff rate and dispersion reductions and the elimination o f other import barriers (import taxes and 
quantitative restrictions). Import price liberalization was supposed to correct for relative price 
distortion and thus provide an allocation o f resources according to their degrees o f relative 
scarcity. Also taxes on traditional exports were significantly reduced.
These free market policies were implemented gradually and on systematic basis from 1986 to 
1994 and in a somewhat temporarily discontinuous fashion during 1995-1996. Overall these reduced 
the mean tariff rate and the dispersion. The import tariff ranges were substantially narrowed by 
lowering the tariff ceiling from 240% in 1982 to 16% in 1999. The tariff structure currently prevailing 
is characterized by a growing number of tariff code lines found in the 0% rate (30%) and by a 
reduction of the number of lines on which a greater than 41% tariff rate is levied (1.1%).
Besides tariff reduction, the reform abolished eventually import surcharges, import 
deposits, licenses and permits. Also after Costa Rica joined GATT in 1990 it replaced 
quantitative import restrictions with tariffs. Taxes on non-traditional exports disappeared after 
1985 while taxes on traditional exports have been reduced. This has helped in part to insulate 
fiscal performance from primary commodity price variation.
However, import duties still represent and important source o f government revenue and 
structural adjustment policies have in fact render fiscal accounts dependent on import revenue 
sources. This is the result o f an increase in the import base that has more than compensated the 
decrease in the import tariff rate.
State intervention policies took the form o f non traditional export promotion policies 
which in some cases boiled down to income and other tax exemptions. In addition, exchange rate 
policy was geared to maintain a real exchange rate favourable to export performance. Ultimately, 
this type o f government intervention was justified on grounds similar to those put forward to 
defend tariffs for infant industries. Namely, it was a question o f compensating the anti export bias 
that characterized earlier commercial policy regimes. From a fiscal viewpoint foregone costs on 
the implementation o f export promotion policies will diminish with as the CAT ceases to have an 
impact on the expenditure side o f fiscal accounts.
This fact may give more leeway for government manoeuvre from the revenue side. It may 
also provide an opportunity to decrease import rates even further and deepen trade liberalization. 
Yet there is always the possibility that given an import tax base, a decrease in the relative price of 
tradables may generate an increase in import consumption so as to maintain the fiscal 
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Openness NTE/TE TGAP CAG
1980 17.8 9.2 62.0 1.15 0.75 10.3 14.8
1981 -2.3 65.1 21.2 114.4 1.70 0.72 5.0 15.2
1982 -7.3 81.7 39.8 119.9 1.34 0.62 (+)2.7 11.1
1983 2.9 10.7 41.6 97.5 1.18 0.66 0.6 10.0
1984 8.0 17.3 44.4 97.1 1.15 0.66 (+)0.4 6.8
1985 0.5 10.9 50.5 99.3 1.11 0.58 1.8 7.4
1986 5.5 15.4 56.0 100.5 1.06 0.57 0.9 3.6
1987 4.8 16.4 62.8 99.9 1.21 0.73 4.2 8.3
1988 3.4 25.3 75.8 103.9 1.26 0.94 2.0 6.6
1989 5.7 10 81.5 100.5 1.36 1.09 4.5 9.2
1990 3.6 27.3 91.6 100.0 1.44 1.13 6.7 8.7
1991 2.3 25.3 122.4 108.2 1.41 1.52 0.8 1.8
1992 7.7 17 134.5 100.6 1.49 1.85 5.3 6.0
1993 6.3 9.1 142.2 99.7 1.57 2.1 7.7 9.0
1994 4.5 19.9 157.1 99.6 1.54 2.03 6.4 6.3
1995 2.4 22.6 180.2 95.3 1.64 1.93 3.0 4.0
1996 -0.6 13.9 207.7 96.2 1.77 2.4 2.5 2.9
1997 3.7 11.2 232.6 97.4 3.1 1.4 2.2
1998 6.2 12.4 257.2 97.9 4.1 1.9 2.8
Source: ECLAC (1999).
Note: PER = Real exchange rate.
NTE = non traditional exports. 
TE = total exports.
CAG = current account gap. 
TGAP = Trade Gap.
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Table 27
COSTA RICA: FISCAL INDICATORS
Y ears F isca l G ap T a x  G D P  ratio
Stock  o f  
Internal D e b t
(M ill. U S D )
Internal debt 
G D P  ratio
Interests 
G D P  ratio
Interests G E  
ratio
1980 8 .2 11.3
1981 3 .6 12.1
1982 2 .6 12 .6
1983 4 .2 15 .4 3 5 6 .1 11 .4
1984 3 .0 15.1 3 5 5 .0 9 .7
1985 1.9 15 .0 3 8 7 .4 9 .9
1986 3.3 13 .6 5 0 2 .5 11 .4
1987 2 .0 14.5 6 1 8 .6 13 .6 1.5 8 .7
1988 2 .5 14 .4 6 0 9 13 .2 1.7 9.3
1989 4 .1 14 .4 7 5 9 14.5 1.9 9 .9
1990 4 .4 14 .0 8 7 2 .4 15.3 2 .4 12 .8
1991 3.1 14 .4 8 9 5 .1 15 .9 3 .2 18.1
1992 1.9 15.1 9 9 6 .2 14 .8 2 .8 16.1
1993 1.9 15.3 1 2 9 0 .4 17. 2 .4 13 .4
1994 6 .9 14 .7 1 6 5 4 .9 19 .9 3 .4 15.3
1995 4 .5 16 .0 2  113 .9 2 3 .0 4 .8 2 .2
1996 5 .2 16 .2 2  2 3 8 .7 2 4 .2 5.3 2 4 .4
1997 3 .9 16.5 4 .6 2 2 .1
1998 3 .2 17 .0 3 .8 18 .9
S o u rce: E C L A C  (1 9 9 9 ); L iza n o  (1 9 9 7 ). 
N o te : G E = g overn m en t expenditure.
Table 28
COSTA RICA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S FISCAL REVENUES, 1987-2002
(Millions of colones)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2002
Total revenue 44 642 54 200 65 100 76 010 102 150 140 900 167 500 197 000 264 525 314 500 377 500 459 700 540 315 654 625 883 285
Total Tax revenue 35 518 44 841 54 237 67 026 87 139 128 588 156 243 183 513 247 840 299 485 363 121 448 876 535 546 656 300 907 792
Internal sources of revenue 21 062 28 499 31 845 37 667 49 565 64 653 79 338 97 170 127 423 167 802 202 086 239 189 298 433 365 254 477 602
Income Tax 6 287 8 035 9 607 11 820 14 545 19 013 26 942 34 789 47 164 53 380 66 268 88 588 113 55 140 179 181 313
Income surcharge 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Planilla tax 563 972 1 084 1 345 1 745 3 102 5 147 7 179 9 706 12 398 14 454 15 500 19 046 22 233 29 210
Real estate transfer 124 226 312 366 504 1 082 1 419 1 389 1 656 2 019 2 705 2 619 3 177 3 852 5 494
Territorial 124 201 333 352 295 370 510 453 573 565 0 0 0 0 0
Sales tax 5233 7 177 8 411 10 993 21 110 25 691 27 283 30 444 40 498 67 025 76 936 77 816 81 888 114 176 147 680
Selective consumption tax 3381 3 846 4 593 5 458 5 927 8 137 9 224 10 062 13 395 18 119 26 613 28 926 33 414 38 213 49 427
Specific consumption tax 1167 1 990 1 934 2 093 318 161 23 1 921 21 24 34 6 787 20 160 23 284 30 117
Vehicles 225 1 676 1 392 1 862 2 516 2 848 4 552 4 746 8 423 6 944 9 082 13 416 13 203 15 943 24 847
Seals 670 1 001 959 1 064 992 1 379 1 552 1 826 1983 2 630 3 440 2 422 2 797 3 231 4 179
Lottery 232 270 337 325 323 357 523 399 576 669 737 403 465 537 695
Other 8 5 9 9 13 15 16 29 24 28 48 36 41 48 62
Goods and service sales 283 340 262 292 324 673 449 462 410 428 322 1 519 1 764 2 026 2 621
Property incomes 633 443 359 155 36 250 139 159 53 62 79 127 141 155 179
Public firms 173 80 166 103 1 182 62 7 9 11 11 8 9 10 11
Public financial institutions 459 63 112 50 34 66 76 150 42 49 67 118 130 144 166
Other 1 300 81 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
Transfer income from public 2 129 2 316 2 253 1 532 917 1 575 1 556 3 305 2 941 3 456 1 368 1 031 1 191 1 375 1 779
bodies 430 983 862 816 106 604 338 414 856 1 006 1 085 533 615 711 919
Central gover. 892 252 254 149 204 261 423 2 126 635 746 117 61 70 81 105
Public firms 807 1 081 1 137 567 607 710 795 765 1 450 1 704 166 437 505 584 755
Public financ. inst
Other non tax revenue 447 799 1 820 1 418 1 010 823 1 345 1 702 1 955 1 502 615 2 004 2 593
External sources 23 133 25 026 32 473 37 544 50 765 74 829 87 152 99 007 135 757 144 996 173 459 219 009 240 147 287 367 403 090
External sales tax 5 410 6 385 8 411 10 887 14 637 25 764 31 636 35 558 47 053 66 775 76 380 98 158 110 472 133 987 190 630
External selective 3 240 3 709 4 942 6 005 6 197 14 703 17 172 20 472 26 921 37 886 44 326 63 509 72 413 88 594 132 439
consumption tax
Import taxes 9 471 9 715 12 625 17 950 24 392 27 204 33 192 37 427 49 359 33 878 46 495 49 507 49 466 55 879 70 503
Import duties 6 750 7 686 9 496 13 977 14 797 23 204 29 681 33 517 42 995 31 351 44 296 50 464 58 445 73 597 116 181
San José Protocol 13 6 4 1 0 0 0 0 2 215 -2 022 -4 571 -9 603 -18 993 -30 327 -65 584
Surcharge 1 017 1 014 1 990 2 633 7 835 1 669 56 6 3 421 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 1 681 1 009 932 1 339 1 760 2 742 3 455 3 904 728 4 549 6 771 8 629 10 014 12 610 19 906
Export taxes 4 945 5 164 203 2 416 5 129 5 959 4 330 4 430 11 154 5 048 4 738 5 889 5 554 6 330 6 247
Coffee ad valorem 2 276 2 309 6 311 250 400 128 8 586 5 354 825 905 1 007 586 1 291 1 229
Other ad valorem 2 460 206 1 228 476 791 924 835 928 1 200 1 082 1 160 1 765 2 034 2 339 2 968
Coffee (profits) 1 736 1 899 391 70 0 0 0 0 37 0 0 0 0 0 0
Banana 619 649 2 187 1 598 3 861 4 543 3 230 2 851 4 546 3 111 2 667 2 939 2 729 2 464 1 680
Others 71 101 1 605 112 77 364 257 65 26 30 6 178 205 236 299
Portuary surcharges 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Others 67 53 184 286 410 788 822 1 120 1 270 1 409 1 520 1 945 2 242 2 577 3 271
Source: Elaborated on the basis Ministry of Finance (1999).
Table 29
COSTA RICA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S FISCAL EXPENDITURE, 1987-2002
(Millions of colones)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2002
Total expenditure 48 935.7 59 001.7 77 850.4 92 432.6 124 181.0 158 717.3 190 196.3 276 607.4 338 274.1 397 968.1 445 308.8 548 936.2 683 345.7 769 835.9 875 765.0
Internal sources of 43 962.8 54 784.1 71 226.2 83 224.2 111 653.5 143 138.7 171 482.7 257 132 309 671.3 371 686.3 416 043 508 017.2 621 330.6 681 550.7 823 189.1
expenditure
Wages and salaries 15 611.3 18 983.0 23 733.6 30 204.4 37 436.6 45 888.5 57 844.5 74 692.5 91 814.5 108 471.0 127 895.0 155 541.4 188 351.6 217 153.9 278 893.8
Pensions 4 569.7 5 815.8 7 514.3 9 743.0 13 358.7 16 965.4 21 143.4 31 141.4 41 353 49 249.9 61 261.3 67 641.2 83 744 100 471.1 138 397.3
Other 12 908.2 15 310.8 19 160.3 16 551.8 21 557.8 28 972 36 437.4 47 829.4 58 662.4 66 156.3 73 157.1
Interests on internal debt 3 849.4 5 036.6 8 200.5 12 649.7 22 302.1 25 494 25 297.1 43 841.2 78 425.3 100 698.1 103 021.5 103 576.5 126 519.5 109 274.5 74 873.5
Banking commission 376.3 952.9 1 630.1 1 790.0 2 267.5 2 235.2 2 284.6 2 856.8 4 071.2 4 673.1 3 825.0
FEES transfer 4 190.7 4 780 5 791.9 6 900 9 347.9 11 722.8 15 085.0 17 137.1 19 973.7 25 699.1 28 142.4 32 290.4 37 376.9 43 033.3 56 349
FODESAF transfer 955.2 2 616 2 633.4 2 916.7 2 462.2 4 623.4 5 918.2 5 861.0 7 413.3 11 845.7 14 165.0 1 179.9 13 127.1 16 502.9 22 497.7
Other transfers 1 502.0 1 289 2 561.9 2 468.6 2 920.7 3 614.0 7 472.5 33 772.6 7 957.9 4 893.1 4 575.9
External sources of 4 972.9 4 217.6 6 624.2 9 279.4 12 527.5 19 202 18 713.6 19 475.4 28 602.8 26 281.8 29 265.6 40 919 62 015.1 88 285.2 52 575.9
expenditure
Interests on external debt 2 577.2 2 427.3 2 330.4 3 347.9 5 069.0 11 778.3 12 469.9 8 571.9 16 076.0 11 425.6 10 189.2 12 449 18 710.3 36 266.8 52 575.9
CAT 2 395.7 1 790.3 4 293.8 5 931.5 7 458.5 7 423.7 6 243.7 10 903.5 12 526.8 14 856.2 19 076.4 28 470 43 304.8 52 018.4 0.0
Source: Elaborated on the basis of Ministry of Finance (1999) and MIDEPLAN (1998). 
Note: FEES = Special Education Fund.
FODESAF = Social Development and Family Assignment Fund.
